Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Iranian F-14 Tomcats Vs America’s F-15 Eagles Over the Persian Gulf.

Iranian F-14 Tomcats Vs America’s F-15 Eagles Over the Persian Gulf.
The recently deployment of an American F-15C Eagle squadron of the Air Force’s 48th Fighter Wing to the Persian Gulf amid heightened tensions with the Islamic Republic of Iran has led to much speculation regarding how the elite air superiority fighters would fare against the Iranian fleet - in particular its most capable fighter the F-14 Tomcat of which approximately four dozen are currently in service. While the F-15C is no longer the foremost air superiority platform in the U.S. inventory, having been surpassed by its fifth generation successor the F-22 Raptor which entered service in December 2005, maintenance issues and low combat readiness plaguing America’s small Raptor fleet led to the withdrawal of a squadron previously deployed to the United Arab Emirates in February 2019 - which were three months later replaced by the older Eagles. In addition, while the F-15C comes second in America’s inventory, due to the U.S. Congress’ export ban on the Raptor the Eagle remains the most capable Western air superiority fighter outside the United States - and is heavily relied on by allies Israel and Saudi Arabia to counter the Iranian Tomcat fleet in the event of a regional conflict. A comparison of the air to air combat capabilities of the Eagles and Tomcats is thus highly relevant given the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, which could see these two U.S built platform go head to head. The F-14 and F-15 were both designed in the 1960s with similar roles in mind, both being heavy and extremely costly twin engine platforms designed for high end air to air combat and intended to replace the third generation F-4 Phantom in the Navy and the Air Force respectively. Upon their entry into service in 1974 and 1976 respectively the Tomcat and Eagle were the only fourth generation combat jets serving anywhere in the world, providing a significant capability advantage over the Soviet fleet until the induction of its own analogues the MiG-31 and Su-27 in 1981 and 1985. The Tomcat, however, was a heavier and more costly platform and weighted more than any other jet of its generation other than the MiG-31 - 55% heavier than the F-15. While this made the fighter less manoeuvrable, particularly when paired when its weaker F110 engines which put out less thrust than the Eagle’s F100, it also allowed it to carry a far heavier payload of missiles and a more powerful radar. The combination of the AIM-54 Phoenix missile, a record holder among American air to air munitions for its extreme range to this day at 190km, with a powerful AN/APG-71 radar, gave the fighter unrivalled beyond visual range capabilities. The F-14's radar system initially had a detection range of around 200km, unrivalled the world over in its time, and this was extended significantly through subsequent upgrades to both U.S. and Iranian models of the Tomcat. Such advanced beyond visual range capabilities were key to providing the F-14 with a reported 160:3 air to air kill ratio during the Iran-Iraq War, with 61 kills by AIM-54. With each Tomcat carrying up to six Phoenix missiles, the fighter was designed with a far greater emphasis on beyond visual range combat than its lighter counterpart commissioned by the U.S. Air Force. Non only did the F-15's radar fall short of providing the situational awareness needed to make full use of the AIM-54's range, but the missile was also too heavy for the Eagle at around 470kg per missile - more than twice the weight of the AIM-7 it was built to deploy. While the F-15C’s sensor and beyond visual range air to air capabilities lagged behind the F-14 when the fighters first entered service and until the end of the Cold War, considerably lower investment in modernisation of the Tomcat following the Soviet collapse and plans for the platform’s early retirement due to its extreme operational costs meant that far more was invested in modernising the beyond visual range capabilities of the Eagle fleet. By 1990 the F-15 was deploying an enhanced version of the AIM-7 Sparrow with a 70km engagement range - 73% shorter than that of the Tomcat with the AIM-54. Beyond visual range capabilities were improved considerably from the 1990s with the induction the AIM-120 air to air missile, which Eagle squadrons were the first in the Air Force to integrate due to their elite status. The most recent of this missile, the AIM-120C, integrates electronic warfare countermeasures considerably more advanced than the AIM-54 and retains a longer range 105km - though at Mach 4 it lacks the Phoenix’s hypersonic speed and remains at a rage disadvantage. While F-15C fighters in foreign service are still at a disadvantage in terms of situational awareness relative to the F-14, Eagles in American service have since the early 2010s begun to integrate new Raytheon APG-63(V)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. These upgrades have been implemented at an extremely slow rate, with just 46 F-15s expected to have been delivered with these upgrades by June 2021 out of a total of 123 jets which are required to integrate this upgrade. As these currently scarce AESA equipped F-15s have been prioritised for deployment to the Pacific- namely to Japan to counter the growing air superiority capabilities of the Chinese Air Force - it is unlikely that they will be available for a long term deployment to the Middle East in the near future. While the U.S. has upgraded its own air superiority fighters, Iran’s defence sector has been far from idle in upgrading the Air Force’s Tomcat fleet to keep the aircraft viable - which is particularly vital given extremely poor state of the remainder of the remainder of the Iranian Air Force in terms of air to air capabilities. Of Iran’s seventeen fighter squadrons, its two F-14 squadrons are the only ones equipped for long range air to air engagements, with its third generation American and Chinese fighters and Soviet MiG-29s lacking modern air to air missiles such as the R-77 or AIM-120 or the sensors to accommodate them which places then at an overwhelming disadvantage against even lighter and less well armed hostiles such as American or Israeli F-16s. Iran’s F-14s have reportedly received over 250 modifications and upgrades each, including the integration of new enhanced radars, modern cockpit displays, superior electronic warfare suites and other critical upgrades. Having sent an F-14 to the Soviet Union for analysis, and since formed close defence ties with China and to a lesser extent Russia which has involved extensive technology sharing, it is speculated that Iran has received technological assistance from third parties to upgrade the American built jets - possibility in exchange for a change to analyse the design of what were until 2005 the most capable Western fighter jets ever developed for air to air combat. Alongside enhancements to the F-14 itself, the AIM-54 has also been phased out of service in favour of the indigenously developed Fakour-90 - a platform which appeared highly similar to the original American system but boasts a considerably enhanced range of 250-300km and superior guidance systems and electronic warfare systems. Again, it Is widely speculated that Iran received assistance in developing this missile - namely from Russia which deploys platforms with similar roles, technologies and performances including the 300km range R-33S and the hypersonic 400km range R-37. Whether the Fakour-90 inherits the Phoenix’s hypersonic speed remains uncertain. Ultimately the outcome of an engagement between the F-15C and the F-14 over the Persian Gulf remains highly uncertain. While the F-14 retains a considerably longer engagement range and detection range, whether the Fakour-90 is as reliable as the AIM-120C remains highly uncertain - particularly given the F-15’s likely advantage in electronic warfare. Given the limitations of its own defence sector, the extent to which Iran has succeeded in acquiring high end Chinese and Russian technologies and integrating them onto the fighters and its missiles is likely to prove decisive in determining whether it can prevail over the Eagle. Assuming comparable reliability of the fighters’ air to air missiles, the Tomcats will remain at a major advantage and be able to fire multiple rounds of Fakour-90 missiles before the F-15s are able to close the distance and engage with their own missiles. With the Fakour-90 expected to have a faster speed and considerably longer no escape range than the AIM-120C, the missile is very likely considerably harder to evade than the lighter missile carried by the Eagle. While the F-22 Raptor would be well placed to circumvent the Tomcat’s range advantage, with its stealth airframe reducing its detection range to well under 100km allowing it to close in, and deploying AIM-120D missiles with a 180km engagement range, the unstealthy Eagle will remain vulnerable to long range attacks. It is only if the Eagle succeeds in closing with the Tomcat that it will retain an advantage, with its superior thrust/weight ratio, more sopyhciated AIM-9X missiles ideal for dogfighting and far higher operational altitude paired with a marginally higher speed providing it with a considerable edge over Iranian Tomcats. #Gm* Courtesy _ Military Watch Magazine

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